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COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS
The stat-eni<jn!- oi f H»M IS in Brown's appeal brief is not
entirely accurate.
(i)

It merits these brief comments:
B rown contends (i t s h r i e l"; a t 3 ) 11 I a bo t ed

for six years to gain the specification of Games'
equipment for the Church Office Building
work towards qnuunq i I»H speriLlo "
six years.

t

Brown did

;.. but not for

Its efforts started in 19 63 and extended

1

The abbreviations first used in Carnes* principal brief
are used here, too: the record on appeal, as paginated by the
court clerk, is designated "RM; the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, entered by The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup on
December 17, 1985, are designated "Findings"; the transcript of
the trial is designated "Tr."; the parties' trial exhibits are
designated "Tr. Ex."; and the Deposition of Daniel Neviaser,
dated February 16, 1983, is designated "Neviaser Depo."
All trial exhibits mentioned in this brief were included in
the Addendum of Carnes* principal brief.
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to the early fall of 1965.

(Tr. 17.)

The project

then sat dormant for nearly three years.

There is no

evidence in the trial record that Brown made any
further efforts on the project between the onset of
dormancy and its termination in August, 1968.

In

fact, when the project was reactivated in February,
1969, it was the Johnston Company, Carnes* new sales
representative in Albuquerque, who undertook the
work.

(PI. Tr. Ex. 101.)

(ii)

Brown contends (its brief at 3) it was

terminated in 1968 " . . . shortly before Carnes1
equipment was specified in the plans for the
project."

There is no evidence in the trial record

which indicates when the equipment was specified (or,
when the Church paid for it or when Carnes paid
commissions to Long-Deming and to the Johnston
Company).

This much is known, however.

The March,

1969 deadline (of the five month extension period in
which Brown could still earn commissions) passed
without an order for Carnes1 equipment.

Sometime

afterwards, but not disclosed in the trial record,
Carnes* equipment was specified for the Office
Building and the construction contract was awarded.
(iii)

Brown contends (its brief at 3) its fear of

losing part of its commission on the project was

-2-

fueled by several considerate •*• .

Perh.ips.

But a

.oret 'il review of the correspondence between Carnes
and Brown indicates Brown's only real fear was the
potential

^. .

others on the job,

* <iu -^<->-if icat

»n commission with

Bridgers & Paxton Consulting

Engineers, Inc., the project's associate mechanical
engI net - \ uis 1 ucd Led 1n Albuquerque.

If Bridgers &

Paxton formally specified Carnes* equipment. \ne New
Mexico sales repress

v

«*-i

:

oyd

Engineering, =^.? idi«:i- the Johnston Company)
automatically earned under the sales agreemen ...*
portion of. the commission for the specification
credit,

It was i hi s concern, and -:ot others, which
(See t.^

monopolized Brown's attention.
Exs

•-.
(iv)

, PI. Tr.

104; Neviaser Depo, at 11-14.)

Brown contends (its briep~ at ^s Carnes 1

national sales manager, Daniel

r

w\ a?*-.

committed in

writing to pay Brown, the specification credit, the
approval credit, and the territory credit for the
project "when i I was I inihinnl
time was,"

Not i. iae.

i io matter when that

Neviaser1 s letter did not

guarantee the payment of credits forever. (PI. Tr.
. . 2
Ex. 106,)
:•
-."laser testified he had no

1

Mr. Neviaser was deposed in Wisconsin in 1983. His
deposition was received into evidence and portions were read
into the record at trial. (Tr. 32.) The relevant pages of his
deposition transcript include 14-18. (R. 816.)
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intention to guarantee unconditionally any commission
to Brown.

To receive a commission of any kind, Brown

was required to be a sales representative when the
commission was payable.

If Brown were not, it was not

entitled to a commission under the sales agreement.
(v)

Under the parties* sales agreement, a

terminated sales representative earned a commission
for an order of Carnes' equipment which was placed
during the thirty day period following termination.
(PI. Tr. Ex. 109, 1f 14.)

Brown contends (its brief at

4) it was customary for Carnes to enhance the
representative's opportunity for a commission by
extending the thirty day period.
(Neviaser Depo. at 16-17.)

In fact, Carnes did

precisely that in this case.
August, 1968.

That is true.

Brown was terminated in

(PI. Tr. Ex. 107.)

The normal thirty

day period expired in late September.

Brown requested

an extension (believing the construction contracts
were to be bid in January, 1969), and Carnes extended
the period to March, 1969 —

five additional months.

(PI. Tr. Exs. 108, 103.)
(vi)

Brown assumes throughout its brief that it

alone was responsible for the incorporation of Carnes'
equipment in the Office Building.

Neither the court's

findings nor the evidence at trial support the
assumption.

At the time Brown was terminated, Carnes'

equipment had not been specified, ordered, or
-4-

installed.

Clearly, Long-Deming and the Johnston

Company contributed to the effort.

There is nothing

in the record to the contrary.

ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
The trial court determined Carnes owed a 4% commission
(for specification credit) to Brown.

The award was not based

on the clear language of the sales agreement between the
parties.

Rather, the court based it on what it perceived as

the implied duty of good faith Carnes owed to Brown, which
Carnes had breached by not guaranteeing the commission to Brown
before Carnes employed Long-Deming.

Carnes acknowledges the

existence of an implied duty of good faith in all contracts,
but contends the trial court misapplied the doctrine in this
case.

In effect, the trial court rewrote the sales agreement

(although it specifically found it to be unambiguous) in order
to afford Brown equitable relief.
Having determined Carnes owed a commission, the court
calculated its amount.

That calculation was improperly based

(i) on dollar amounts alleged in the amended complaint filed by
Brown and (ii) on answers to interrogatories filed by
Long-Deming, Carnes* co-defendant.

No competent evidence was

produced at trial on the issue of damages.
Brown cross-appealed for a 10% commission and for
prejudgment interest calculated from 1972, rather than the 1978
date chosen by the trial court.

Brown is entitled to neither.

-5-

CROSS APPEAL
1.

BROWN IS NOT ENTITLED TO 10% COMMISSIONS.
The trial court held Brown was entitled to a

commission.

It awarded Brown 4% ($20,000) of the net cost of

the Carnes* equipment installed in the Church Office Building
(calculated by the court to be $500,000).

Brown has appealed,

contending it is entitled to 10% of the net amount.
Carnes denies it owes any commission to Brown.

If a

commission is awarded, however, it must be measured at 4%.
A.

The Sales Agreement Was Not Amended to Guarantee Brown A
10% Commission.
Brown worked with the architects and engineers to have

Carnes1 equipment specified in the construction plans for the
Office Building and ultimately installed in the structure.
Eventually, it became concerned that the active involvement of
Bridgers & Paxton on the project threatened its commission for
specification credit:

if Bridgers & Paxton, the project's

mechanical engineer located in Albuquerque, formally specified
Carnes1 equipment, the New Mexico sales representative of
Carnes automatically earned a portion of the commission for the
specification credit.

On June 2, 1965, Brown wrote Neviaser

about the matter:
The samples that were charged partially to us for
the
L.D.S. CHURCH OFFICE BLDG.
job were used to seek specification for Carnes
products for that job. Having done as much as we have
with Bridgers & Paxton, and with the architect, who is
located in Salt Lake, and who is really the ultimate
specifying agent, we are reluctant to accept the idea
that a specification split with the representative in

Albuquerque [then Boyd Engineering] should be made at
the time of sale.
We would like to have a letter from you in our
file confirming our idea that we should get
specification credit as well as territory and order
credit for the L.D.S. Church Office Building when it
is finalized. The fact that Bridgers & Paxton has
their home office in Albuquerque does not seem to
justify a split on specification with the Albuquerque
representative for this job.
(PI. Tr. Ex. 110.)

Brown's letter was answered twicee

First/

on June 13/ 1965/ by Kenneth H. Watts, then western regional
sales manager for Carnes:
Your June 2 letter directed to Dan Neviaser was
forwarded to me.
I am the first one to realize the tremendous amount of
work and time you have spent on the subject job. I
would also like to point out that a great deal of
effort has been done with the firm of Bridgers &
Paxton in the past three to four years by our
Albuquerque representative, Boyd Engineering/ and the
Carnes Corporation.
I feel that if we did not have a good relationship
with Bridgers & Paxton in Albuquerque# it would have
been much more difficult to secure a good
specification on the subject job. You are probably
not aware of the day by day calls the local
representative receives for various questions during
the design of a project. Many times these questions
are not important enough to send you copies of
correspondence.
In Dan Neviaser's October 6 letter to Mr, Bill
Blackwell of Boyd Engineering, Albuquerque, he
indicated that the specification credit should be
split between Albuquerque and your office. You
indicated you participated financially for some
samples for the subject job. Boyd Engineering has
also participated financially in two trips of Bridgers
& Paxton personnel to our plant in Verona. Personally
I would like to see you get 100% credit but I think,
under the circumstances, it is only fair to split the
commission with Boyd Engineering. After all, the
situation could be reversed at some time.
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(PI. Tr. Ex. 95.)
responded:

Two days later, on June 15th, Neviaser also

This is to state that you are to receive specification
credit as well as territory and order credit for the
Latter-Day Saints Church Office Building when it is
finished.
There is no question in our mind that the
specification orginated in Salt Lake City, and
although Bridgers & Paxton have their home office in
Albuquerque, all of the activity that they have been
involved in has been in your area.
You certainly deserve this order in its entirety.
(PI. Tr. Ex. 106.)
3
Brown's theory (now and at trial ) is that the sales
agreement had been amended by the exchange of letters between
Brown and Neviaser.

The theory has no basis in fact or law.

The trial court rejected it, and for good reasons.
First, the parties did not intend to amend the sales
agreement.

Their discussions dealt exclusively with the

potential split of specification commission between Brown and
the New Mexico sales representative.

Consider the following:

The sales agreement required the specification
commission to be split.

Neviaser believed, however, the

specification efforts to date (June, 1965) had originated more
in Salt Lake City than in Albuquerque.
13.)

(Neviaser Depo. at

So, in an effort to avoid a potential quarrel between

sales representatives (Neviaser Depo. at 18), he made an

3

See Tr. 72-73, 99-102, 131-134.
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exception to the general rule and expressed Carnes* willingness
to award the specification commission to Brown:
[My letter of June 15, 1965] is simply a determination
by the factory, by the manufacturer that there
deserves to be special consideration for specification
credit in this specific case, in that the
specification credit should not be divided between two
different locations.
(Neviaser Depo. at 15.)

Asked whether he intended the letter

to guarantee unconditionally Brown's receipt of all three
commissions even after Brown's termination, Neviaser responded:
. • • [I]t goes with the contract because when I refer
to territory and order credit, it implies that [Brown]
will be selling the product, the project himself and
that he was—would still be the sales representative
in order to make that sale.

Absolutely not because it also doesn't guarantee
[Brown] would get order credit, unless [Brown] gets
the orderc
The letter is obviously amended to the terms of
the existing agreement, goes with that agreement, runs
with that agreement.
If the sales agreement is terminated, I would say
that this [the letter] is terminated.
(Neviaser Depo. at 14-15, 16.)
The sales agreement automatically gave commissions to
any terminated sales representative whose active price
quotations yielded equipment orders within the thirty day
period following termination.

(PI. Tr. Ex. 109, If 14.)

It was

not unusual for Carnes, said Neviaser, to extend on occasion
the thirty day period up to six months, precisely what Carnes
did here.

(Neviaser Depo. at 17.)

-9-

Any such extension was

determined at the time of termination.

The expiration of the

extension was absolute, however:
. . . I have never heard of a circumstance where the
previous agent got a commission for the order beyond
the time that was agreed upon, at the time of
termination.
(Neviaser Depo. at 18.)
Second, the purported amendment was valid and
enforceable only if Brown and Carnes exchanged sufficient
consideration —

new mutual promises in which each party

pledged to give up something to the benefit of the other.4

The

existence of consideration is determined by examining whether
the person against whom a promise is to be enforced, the
promisor (Carnes), contemporaneously received something in
return from the person to whom he made the promise, the
promisee (Brown).

Here, that is a simple enough question.

Carnes did not receive any new consideration from Brown:

any

promise by Brown (and there was none) was only to do what it
already had a "preexisting legal duty" to do; or, the legal

4

There are exceptions to the rule that only promises
supported by consideration are enforceable. The doctrine of
promissory estoppel is such an exception. It requires that
certain elements exist: (1) an existing promise; (2) made with
the expectation it will induce another party to rely upon it;
(3) justifiably relied upon substantially; (4) to the injury of
the promissee should the promise not be enforced. See Union
Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Brothers, 15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000
(1964); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1979). The
doctrine does not apply here. Brown did not rely to its
detriment on Carnes' purported promise. All of Brown's efforts
prior to the June letters were expended pursuant to the
original sales agreement. And, there is no evidence that Brown
relied on the alleged promise and substantially altered its
position after June, primarily because the project was at a
standstill from 1965 until 1968 and because Brown was
terminated in 1968. See Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah
1974) .
-10-

value already given by Brown to support the original sales
agreement was "past consideration" and could not have been used
again or brough forward to support the amendment; or, the
consideration was not an "accord and satisfaction" because the
doctrine does not apply if the debtor (Carnes) presumably has
(and that was Brown's argument in its June 2d letter) a prior
legal obligation to perform under the contract*

See, e.g.,

Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, 560 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1977); Baggs v. Anderson 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Hart, 25 Utah 2d 244, 480 P.2d 131 (1971); 1A
A.Lo Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §§ 210-239 (1963).
Brown (its brief at 9-10) side-steps completely the
issue of consideration.

It claims only that parties can modify

their contract, although the modification may conflict with the
original terms, so long as their minds met on the changes; and
that relinquishment of a contract right, as in dispute
resolutions, is sufficient consideration for a promise.

Carnes

agrees with both principles, but they do not solve the issue
here.

Contracting parties still must exchange some measure of

consideration to support their modifications.
this case?
B.

Where is it in

Brown did not relinquish anything.

Brown Did Not Earn Approval or Territorial Commissions.
Brown contends the court granted it the commission for

specification credit which had been paid by Carnes to
Long-Deming, but neglected to include in its award the
additional commission which had been paid to Long-Deming for

-11-

approval and territorial credit.

The same evidence which led

the court to conclude Carnes must pay Brown for the
specification credit, Brown says, should have led the court to
award it the approval and territorial credits, too.
Brown apparently does not understand the court's
decision.

The court found Brown had performed substantially

all of the specification work on the project and, therefore,
was entitled to a specification commission.

(Tr. 159, 160.)

The specification commission had in fact been paid to
Long-Deming and had been split (80-20) between Long-Deming and
the Johnston Company, then Carnes1 New Mexico representative,
in recognition of the latter1s efforts in assisting Bridgers &
Paxton.

The court found the commission split was both

appropriate and reasonable.

(Tr. 159, 160, 170.)

So, when the

court awarded a specification commission to Brown, the
commission was calculated precisely as Long-Deming•s had been:
80% of 5%, or net 4%.5

5 The sales agreement offered two similar but slightly
different approaches for the calculation of commissions. (PI.
Tr. Ex. 109, Addendum No. 3, If 4.) If equipment were purchased
directly by a customer, one method was used; if it were sold
intead to a Carnes distributor, another method was used. Given
the facts of the case, the trial court selected the first
approach. (Tr. 167.) Consequently, comissions were calculated
in this manner:
1,

Specification credit - 5% of the net amount of
the invoice, or 40% of the net commission,
whichever is less.

2.

Approval credit - 2 1/2% of the net amount of the
invoice, or 20% of the net commission, whichever
is less.
-12-

Long-Deming had been paid full approval and
territorial commissions, too.

These the trial court

intentionally declined to award to Brown.

When the

construction contracts actually were finalized, and the
equipment ordered and installed, Long-Deming was representing
Carnes and handling all of the problems associated with the
construction.

The court described the situation in this

manner:
The Court certainly recognizes that Long Deming
was on board when the contract was signed up, or the
sale was ultimately made, and that Long Deming was in
place when the problems arose, and it had obligations
to service and so forth. And that within that
context, [Carnes] was in a position to see that part
of the commission went to Long-Deming for services
which it might ultimately render. . . .

[After Brown's termination] it was generally past
history in terms of the specification workup process,
and the thing left to be concluded . . . was the final
solicitation of the sale, the servicing of the sale
after it was in place, and the ultimate tying down of
the signoff on specifications, the bid process, and
ultimate acceptance of the bid. And as to those
responsibilities it appeared to the Court that both

(Footnote 5 continued from previous page)
3.

Territorial credit - 2 1/2% of the net amount of
the invoice, or 20% of the net commission,
whichever is less.

There was no evidence presented at trial about the actual
dollar amounts of commissions paid by Carnes to Long-Deming and
to the Johnston Company. Thus, the court focused on the net
cost of the Carnes* equipment installed in the Office Building
and the corresponding percentages described above (5% and
2 1/2 % and 2 1/2%).

-13-

the representative in New Mexico and Long Deming, the
successor representative, were the only people present
to perform those services, which they did,
(Tr. 161, 169-170.)

Long-Deming, not Brown, had earned the

approval and territorial commissions,
2.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED.

IF IT IS

ALLOWED, IT MUST BE CALCULATED FROM 1978, NOT 1972.
The trial court awarded Brown prejudgment interest of
6% per year, calculated from January 1, 1978 to the date of the
judgment (December 17, 1985).

Brown contends the interest

should be calculated from January, 1972, instead.
wrong.

No prejudgment interest should be awarded.

Brown is
If it is

allowed, however, the interest must be calculated from 1978,
not from 1972.
The trial court first broached the subject of
prejudgment interest at the close of trial:
I can find no evidence, other than the statement
of [Allen Tibbals, Brown's prior] counsel, and that's
about the best I have to go on in terms of ultimate
payment. But again, the only reference I found were
statements made by Mr. Tibbals about the building
being dedicated in 1972, as I recall. And he, I
think, made reference that final payments, or some
final payments had not been made as late as 1977,
6

In 1981 the Utah Legislature amended § 15-1-1 Utah Code
Ann. (1986) and increased the interest rate from 6% to 10%.
The amendment specifically excluded contracts made before May
14, 1981, however. Those contracts still earn the 6% rate
authorized by prior law. The sales agreement between Carnes
and Brown was executed on May 24, 1961. (PI. Tr. Ex. 109.) It
may earn only 6%.
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because of the problems. There is nothing stronger
than that in the record, and that is the
representation of counsel that stands in the published
deposition [of Ted R. Brown], unrefuted. I can do no
better in terms of time frame, that I can find, on
that.
The case is old; things are stale. And I'm not
laying blame on you for that, but I think history
could have been tracked a little better in terms of
the underlying damage issue.

The Court concludes and finds that . . . interest
ought to be allowed [on the judgment] at the legal
rate, which is 6% per annum, from January 1, 1978,
until the date of judgment . . .

MR. HOWELL: Excuse me, your Honor. Did you say
that interest was to run from January, 1978?
THE COURT:
MR. HOWELL:

January 1, 1978.
Not 19 68?

THE COURT: The best statement at all that I an
[sic] find anywhere is simply the unchallenged
statement of Allen Tibbals that some of the payments
were still outstanding in 1977. If there is something
that I've missed in the record that supports something
other than that, I guess I would rely on it. At this
point I know of nothing.

(Tr<, 165-168.)

The award was included in the Findings of Fact
7
and Conclusions of Law entered by the court.
Under the sales agreement, commissions were to be paid
by Carnes to its sales representatives when Carnes received

7

See Findings at 8, 1f 46; at 10, 1f 7.

-15-

full payment for its equipment.
3, If 4 and 1f 5.)

(PI. Tr. Ex. 109, Addendum No.

Brown admits (its brief at 15) Allen Tibbals

believed final payment was made by the Church to Carnes as late
as 1977 and it admits the trial court did not find any
evidence, aside from Allen Tibbal's comments, upon which to
determine (i) the date Carnes was paid by the Church and (ii)
the date Carnes, in turn, paid commissions to its sales
representatives.

Brown contends, however, there is additional

evidence in the record which proves the commissions actually
were paid by Carnes to Long-Deming in 1972.

Thus, Brown

concludes, prejudgment interest should have been calculated
from January, 1972, not 1978.

Brown's argument simply is not

correct.
The additional evidence which Brown now touts does not
appear in the trial record.

It is material produced in

pre-trial discovery, but never offered and received in evidence
at trial.

For example, Brown first refers to the pre-trial
Q

deposition

of its president, Ted R. Brown, for proof that the
9
Church Office Building was dedicated in 1972.
Quite apart
from any debate over the merits of Mr. Brown's deposition

8

1981.

See Deposition of Ted R. Brown, dated November 23,
(R. 814.)

9

The date of the building's dedication is irrelevant.
The issue, rather, is the specific date commissions were
payable by Carnes to its sales representatives. That date
might be identified as the date the Church paid Carnes or as
the date Carnes actually paid Long-Deming and the Johnston
Company.
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testimony,
evidence*

the deposition transcript itself was not trial
The transcript was merely "published" at trial so

Games' counsel could use it to impeach Mr. Brown's testimony
during cross-examination.

(Tr. 78.)

The deposition was not

received into evidence, and for good reason:
present in court to testify personally.
804.

Mr. Brown was

See Utah R. Evid. 801,

Notice, in addition, that when it refers to the

deposition, Brown focuses on the remarks of its counsel, Allen
Tibbals, on the testimony of the deponent.

Similar to the

trial court, Brown is willing to try the case using its counsel
as a witness.
Brown also refers to some interrogatory answers filed
by Long-Deming.

See Answer of Defendant Lonq-Deminq-Utah, Inc.

to Plaintiff's Third Set of Interrogatories, dated January 6,
1983c

(R. 479-485).

An attachment to the answers, contends

Brown, proves that the Church paid Carnes and that Carnes paid

10

In his deposition, Ted R. Brown was asked when the
Church paid for the Carnes equipment. Mr. Brown said he
thought payment was tendered in 1972. Allen Tibbals, Brown's
lawyer, disagreed with his client:
MR. TIBBALS:

No.

I'll have to interrupt on that.

A lot of it hadn't been paid for yet in 1972 when
I was—brought these people in, because they got into
a great big hassle between the Church and Carnes.
Some of the equipment wouldn't work, so the Church
refused to pay for it.
There was going to be a suit brought, but then
Carnes sent some people out here, and Carnes decided
that they'd make an adjustment. Now, what the nature
of the adjustment was was never disclosed. But as
late as 1977 some of the equipment hadn't been paid
for by the church.
Brown Depo. at 51.

Long-Deming, both before January, 1972, Actually, the
attachment proves nothing of the kind.

Many dates of payment

are missing, and some reflect payment in 1973; moreover, it is
not known whether the attachment includes all of the equipment
installed in the Office Building.

The most telling comment

about the use of the attachment, however, is this:

it was

never offered and received into evidence at trial.

If the

attachment is so important, why was it not used at trial?

It

certainly may not be used in this appeal.
The deposition testimony and the interrogatory
attachment may not be used by Brown to enlarge the period for
prejudgment interest.

They do serve to make a point, however.

Prejudgment interest is awarded only when the loss can be fixed
as of a particular time.

See, e.g., Anderson v. State Farm

Fire & Casualty Co., 583 P.2d 101, 104 (Utah 1978).
cannot be fixed to a specific date in this case.

The loss

There is no

evidence in the trial record to indicate when the Church paid
Carnes or to indicate when Carnes paid commissions to
Long-Deming and to the Johnston Company.
whatsoever.
issue.

No evidence

Brown failed to carry its burden of proof on the

The trial court improperly attempted to overcome the

absence of such evidence by relying on the statements of
Brown's counsel for proof.

It cannot be done.

Lawsuits turn

on the testimony of the parties, not their legal counsel's.
Prejudgment interest should be disallowed altogether.
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APPEAL
3.

CARNES DID NOT BREACH ANY IMPLIED DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND
FAIR DEALING.

A,

Breach of the Implied Duty of Good Faith Requires Bad Faith
Conduct.
Brown contends (its brief at 19-23) the scope of the

implied duty of good faith is broader than described by
Carnes.

For Brown, the implied duty of good faith can be

violated even in the absence of a party's bad faith conduct.
Brown cites four Utah cases in support•

Those cases are wholly

inapplicable.
Carnes does not dispute that the implied duty of good
faith prohibits a party to a contract from arbitrarily
withholding its approval of the other party's performance, as
stated in W. P. Harlin Construction Co. v. Utah State Road
Commission, 19 Utah 2d 364, 431 P.2d 792, 793 (1967) and as
asserted by Brown (its brief at 19-20).
however, is inapplicable to this case.

This principle,
Unlike Harlin, none of

the pertinent provisions in the sales agreement reserve the
right of approval or acknowledgment of satisfaction in Carnes.
The arbitrary withholding of approval is simply not an issue
here.
In Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982), this
Court briefly discussed the scope of the implied duty of good
faith.

Id. at 144.

In Cahoon, the appellant refused to

execute the pertinent closing documents to consummate the sale
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of a house.

Id. at 143.

Thereafter, the appellant asserted

the appellee's non-performance (i.e., the timely sale of the
home) as a defense.

This Court held the appellant's willful

refusal to execute the documents which rendered the appellee's
performance impossible was the breach of the implied duty of
good faith.

Id. at 144.

Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293
(Utah 1982) is similar to Cahoon.

In Leigh Furniture, when the

plaintiff became disenchanted with its contract with the
defendant, it repeatedly harrassed the defendant over a
significant period of time, rendering defendant's performance
impossible.

Id. at 296-301. Although defendant's counterclaim

was not submitted on the theory of plaintiff's breach of an
implied duty of good faith, this Court stated in dictum that
the acts committed by the plaintiff might give rise to a breach
of the implied duty of good faith.

Id. at 306.

Unlike Cahoon and Leigh Furniture, Carnes did nothing
to prevent Brown's performance or make its performance more
difficult.

In fact, Carnes granted Brown a five month

extension to enable it to obtain the specification and order of
Carnes' equipment in the Church Office Building.

Brown's

failure to do so was not caused by Carnes' interference or its
refusal to act.
This Court's discussion of the implied duty of good
faith in Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock
Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) was addressed in an
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entirely different context than in this case.

In Weston Ranch,

the defendant asserted, among other claims, that the consulting
and management contract was rendered illusory by the contract's
provision allowing Resource Management Co. (RMC) the right to
terminate the contract at will.

Id. at 1036-40.

In discussing

the illusory nature of the contract, this Court stated that an
implied duty of good faith would prevent RMC from terminating
the contract capriciously or in bad faith and, therefore, the
contract was not illusory.

Id.

The illusory nature of Brown's agreement is not at
issue here.

Brown has never contended the agreement was

illusory and unenforceable.

Furthermore, Brown has never

contended its termination by Carnes was in bad faith.
could it.

Nor

The trial court specifically found the contract was

not terminated in bad faith.
None of Brown's cases support its broad construction
of the implied duty of good faith.

In each case, this Court

focused upon the parties' actions to determine whether a party
had acted in bad faith, capriciously or arbitrarily.

No bad

faith conduct was found in either Harlin or Weston Ranch (RMC's
bad faith termination was not an issue in Weston Ranch).

In

Cahoon and Leigh Furniture, this Court held the implied duty of
good faith had been breached.
however,

The breach in both cases,

was based upon the parties' intentional bad faith

conduct.
A 1983 Utah case further suggests that a party must
act in bad faith to breach an implied duty of good faith.
-21-

In

Jacobsen Construction Co. v. Industrial Indemnity Co., 657 P.2d
1325 (Utah 1983), the plaintiff-contractor sued its insurer,
INA, when INA denied coverage of the losses alleged by
plaintiff.

Ld. at 1327.

INA filed a third-party complaint

against Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc.

Structo counterclaimed

and asserted it was plaintiff's subcontractor and as such an
insured under INA's policy.
Structo.

Id. at 1327-29.

Therefore, INA could not sue

This Court agreed.

Id.

Structo further asserted it was entitled to recover
its attorney's fees in defending the action against INA because
INA had acted in bad faith when it filed the third-party
complaint against Structo.

Id. at 1329.

Structo's assertion, this Court stated:

In addressing
"While we acknowledge

that contracting parties owe each other the duty to deal in
good faith . . . there is no evidence here of bad faith on the
part of INA . . . ."

Id.

(citation omitted).

Based upon Jacobsen Construction, upon the cases cited
by Brown, and upon the cases cited by Carnes in its principal
brief, bad faith conduct by the alleged breaching party must be
found before the implied duty of good faith can be breached.
The trial court made no finding of bad faith by Carnes.

The

termination of Brown and its replacement by Long-Deming was
done in good faith.

Therefore, the trial court's conclusion

that Carnes breached an implied duty of good faith to Brown is
incorrect.
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B.

A Condition Which Contradicts an Agreement's Clear, Express
Provisions Will Not be Implied.
The sales agreement is clear and unambiguous.

Brown

suggests (its brief at 17, 24) the contract must be ambiguous
because the trial court found its provisions "only appeared to
be somewhat clear and unambiguous."

Brown, however, has not

and could not specify any ambiguity in the pertinent
provisions.

Furthermore, the trial court made no such finding.

The implied duty of good faith does not justify the
trial court's implication of conditions which contradict the
clear, express terms of the agreement.

In Mann v. American

Western Life Insurance Co., 586 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978) the
plaintiff was employed by the defendant as an insurance agent.
Id. at 462. A written contract was executed which permitted
either party to terminate on thirty days written notice.

It

further specified certain premiums to which plaintiff would be
entitled even if he were terminated.

Subsequently, the

plaintiff entered into negotiations, both written and verbal,
to improve his agency agreement.

Id. Shortly after new

management was installed, plaintiff was terminated.
463.

Plaintiff asserted three claims:

Id. at

(1) defendant

terminated the contract in bad faith; (2) the written contract
had been orally modified which increased the amount of
commission due plaintiff; and (3) the defendant had been
unjustly enriched at the plaintiff's expense,
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id. at 462. The

trial court directed a verdict in defendant's favor on all
three theories, which was affirmed by this Court,

Id, at

464-65.
In holding the defendant's termination of plaintiff
was not in bad faith, this Court refused to imply terms which
were inconsistent with the contract's express terms and stated:
Mann cites substantial authority for the
proposition that, even though a party to a contract
may have a right to terminate it without cause, he
must nevertheless exercise the right in good faith and
not at a time or in a manner which inflicts
unnecessary injury or works unconscionable injustice.
Courts have permitted considerations of equity to
control over clear contract language covering
termination . . . . A variety of tort and contract
theories have been contrived to permit recovery in
these situations, and the "duty of good faith" theory
which Mann advances is among them.
Whatever the justification for judicial remaking
of the party's contracts in these extreme cases may
have been, it cannot be adopted as a general precept
of contract law that, whenever one party to a contract
can show injury flowing from the exercise of a
contract right by the other, a basis for relief will
be somehow devised by the courts.
Id. at 464.

(emphasis added.)

Furthermore, two of the cases cited by Brown support
this proposition.

In Harlin, the parties entered into a

construction contract.

431 P.2d at 792.

The contract

expressly provided for the type of pile driving equipment to be
used and the rating at which the equipment was to operate.
Id.at 793. Among others, the contract allowed the use of a

-24-

combustion-type hammer, approval of which was left to the
defendant-

The contract did not specify when the defendant

would be required to approve use of a combustion-type hammer.
Thus, this Court's holding that defendant could not arbitrarily
withhold approval.

The plaintiff further asserted the implied

duty of good faith required defendant either to accept the
manufacturer's rating of the hammer or to establish the rating
by appropriate tests.

The plaintiff argued that because

defendant had failed to do either, it acted arbitrarily in
withholding its approval,

id.

This Court rejected plaintiff's

contention because the contract did not require such conduct by
the defendant.

Id. at 794. The Court refused to imply any

terms through the implied duty of good faith which were not
already expressed in the contract.

Icl. Furthermore, the Court

stated in Cahoon that the implied duty of good faith requires
the parties to a contract to cooperate in the performance of
the contract in accordance with its "expressed intent"

641

P.2d at 144.
Here, the trial court did exactly what this Court
refused to do in Harlin and it acted contrary to this Court's
statement in Cahoon.

Using the implied duty of good faith, it

improperly implied a term requiring Carnes to pay Brown
commissions which were earned after Brown's termination,
despite the clear, express terms contained in the sales
agreement.
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C

Neither the Trial Court's Findings Nor the Underlying
Evidence Support Its Conclusion That Carnes Breached Its
Implied Duty of Good Faith,
Brown paraphrases (its brief at 17-18) certain of the

trial court's findings of fact which allegedly support its
conclusion that Carnes breached its implied duty of good
faith.

None of those findings support the trial court's

conclusion, however, if the implied duty of good faith is
interpreted correctly.

A breach of the implied duty of good

faith requires bad faith conduct.

None of the findings cited

by Brown show any bad faith conduct by Carnes.

Furthermore,

the trial court specifically found Brown's termination and the
replacement of Brown by Long-Deming were proper and not in bad
faith.
The evidence shows Carnes acted in good faith in all
its dealings with Brown.

Prior to Brown's termination, in

1965, a dispute arose regarding the commission split between
Brown and Carnes' New Mexico sales representative.

Brown

requested Carnes award all of the specificaction commission to
it.

(PI. Tr. Ex. 110.)

Based upon Brown's efforts to obtain

specification of Carnes' equipment in the Office Building,
Carnes agreed.

(PI. Tr. Ex. 106.)

This adjustment assumed

Carnes' equipment would be specified while Brown's agreement
was still effective.
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A second adjustment occurred in 1968 when Carnes
terminated Brown,

Carnes notified Brown it would be entitled

to any commissions for equipment specified or ordered within 30
days after termination of the agreement,

(PI. Tr. Ex, 107.)

In response, Brown requested Carnes reconsider the 30 day
period allowed by the sales agreement.

(PI. Tr. Ex. 108.)

On

September 10, 1968, Carnes replied and extended for five months
the time within which Brown would be entitled to commissions.
(PI. Tr. Ex. 103.)

Brown was unable to consummate the deal

within the additional time.
All subsequent efforts to obtain specification and
order of Carnes* equipment were expended by Carnes* new
representative, Long-Deming.

Thus, Long-Deming was entitled to

the commissions earned after the additional period expired.
All the evidence shows Carnes acted in good faith in
all its dealings with Brown.

Furthermore, as stated

previously, there was no evidence at trial that Carnes ever
agreed to pay Brown for any equipment specified or ordered
after March 1, 1969.
4.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CALCULATED THE COMMISSION BY
RELYING ON ALLEGATIONS APPEARING IN "PLEADINGS" FILED BY
THE PARTIES OUTSIDE OF TRIAL.
The trial court determined the Church had purchased

$500,000 of Carnes1 equipment for installation in the Office
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Building.

It then used that figure to compute the amount of

the commission owing to Brown.

The courts determination was

not based on competent evidence and was wholly the result of
speculation.
An employee of Brown's testified that, in anticipation
of his testimony at trial, he had attempted to calculate the
cost of the Carnes' equipment installed in the Office Building
and had reduced his figures to an exhibit described as a "price
list."

(PI. Tr. Ex. 111.)

Carnes rightfully objected to the

testimony and to the exhibit on numerous grounds.
principal brief at 28-30.)
exhibit, nevertheless.

(See Games'

The trial court received the

It expressed its dismay about the

strength of Brown's evidence on damages, however, and concluded
Brown should have produced stronger evidence by subpoenaing the
final "as built" plans possessed by the Church.
court, undaunted,
itself.

The trial

then set out to determine the damages by

Those subsequent calculations by the court were

improperly based on an allegation made in the amended complaint
by Brown's prior counsel and on answers to interrogatories
filed by Long-Deming.

The trial court's calculation of

damages was reversible error.

(See Carnes' principal brief at

34-39.)

11

Carnes noted in its principal brief (at 38) that answers
to interrogatories may not be used indiscriminately at trial,
as happened here. This Court follows this limitation, allowing
their use only in limited circumstances, such as impeaching the
trial testimony of the person making them. See Kusy v. K-Mart
Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1984).
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Brown now offers a rejoinder*

The price list prepared

by its witness was proper "secondary evidence," made admissible
by Carnes' destruction of its sales documents and by Brown's
own inability to obtain other relevant, original documents.
The complaint allegation and the interrogatory answers were
used by the trial court, Brown contends, only to corroborate
the testimony of its witness, not to try the merits of the
action.
Brown's reply is not pursuasive.

It is not supported

by the law or by the trial record.
First, Brown's witness attempted to calculate the
overall cost of the Carnes' equipment installed in the Office
Building by manually counting the equipment he could see in a
handful of rooms on a small number of floors in the building
itself and then multiplying the equipment in his sample rooms
by his estimate of the total number of rooms in the entire
building; he then used old price lists of his own and price
quotations given to him by suppliers of competitive equipment
in order to compute a unit price for the Carnes' equipment.
The entire process was awkward and legally objectionable. 12

It

would have been more proper to obtain the orignal "as built"
plans and specifications in the custody of the Church.

Brown

never asked Carnes or Long-Deming for them, presumably because

12

Carnes objected to the testimony.
principal brief at 28-30.
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See Carnes*

Brown knew they were in the possession of the Church itself.
(Tr. 47-48.)
documents.

Nevertheless, Brown never subpoenaed the

Shortly before the noon recess on the first day of

trial and immediately after Brown's witness had explained his
price list, this exchange occurred between the court and
Brown's counsel about the plans and specifications:
THE COURT: I assume those original plans of the
Church are fairly readily accessible to anyone, if you
deem them necessary to produce.
MR. HOWELL: It is about lunch time, and I would
return after the noon break and I'll get copies of the
specifications. There's a couple of things in those
that I would like to call the Court's specific
attention to.
(Tr. at 56.)
promised.

The specifications were never produced as

Brown was willing to rely on something less.
Second, Brown attempts to justify the testimony of its

witness by contending Carnes destroyed relevant, original
documents.

The contention is absolutely false.

There is no

proof whatsoever that Carnes intentionally destroyed documents
relevant to this case.
already.

Carnes has fully explained the matter

(See Carnes' principal brief at 31-34.)
Third, it is clear from reading the trial transcript

that the trial court did not merely use the complaint
allegation and the interrogatory answers to corroborate the
testimony of Brown's witness.

Rather, the trial court relied

on them exclusively to establish the total cost of the
equipment sold to the Church and installed in the Office
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Building.

It is not necessary to quibble, however.

If, as

Brown suggests, the trial court used the documents for
corroboration, that was reversible error.

They were never

offered and received into evidence at trial, and, for that
reason, cannot form any basis for the trial court's decision,
be it corroboration or a decision on the merits.

(See Games'

principal brief at 34-39.)

CONCLUSION
Carnes properly terminated its sales agreement with
Brown and had no continuing obligation to pay a commission
under the specific language of the agreement.

Carnes did not

breach an implied duty of good faith.
The trial court improperly calculated the commission
by using naked allegations in the amended complaint and answers
to interrogatories.

Neither the rules of civil procedure nor

the rules of evidence permit it.
Brown is not entitled to any commission.

Neither is

it entitled to prejudgment interest.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
DATED this 26th day of August, 1986.
JZLE>>^RftPER^. P.C

Sid E. Lewis
A t t o r n e y s for Carnes
Corporation
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